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Mobilizing Latino Voters: 
The Impact of Language and Co-Ethnic Policy Leadership 
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Costas Panagopoulos, Fordham University1 
 
 
Abstract: Building on evidence that Latino voters participate at higher rates when co-
ethnic candidates appear on the ballot, we report the results from a field experiment 
examining whether co-ethnic policy leadership can produce similar mobilization in direct 
democracy elections. The study features a direct-mail campaign conducted during 
California’s 2010 statewide primary election aimed at mobilizing Latino voters. The 
experiment included variation in both in the language of the message sent to voters and 
the extent to it emphasized the pivotal role played by a prominent Latino official in 
placing the policy on the ballot.  We find that mobilization messages are most effective 
when they target voters using their preferred language, at least for English-dominant 
Latinos.  By contrast, our experiment yielded no evidence that co-ethnic policy leadership 
increased voter turnout, although we do show that female voters participate at higher 
rates when the mobilization campaign prominently features a high-profile female official.  
These divergent effects provide lessons for the study of ethnic political participation and 
for the design of effective mobilization campaigns aimed at boosting Latino turnout. 
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As the fastest growing demographic subgroup in the United States, Latinos have begun to 
exercise increasing political clout over the past decade and, partly as a result, have attracted 
mounting attention from candidates and their campaigns.  Exit polls suggest that Latino voters 
made up 10 percent of the national electorate in November 2012, up significantly from just eight 
years earlier.  The Republican Party’s strategic manifesto released shortly after the election — 
the Growth & Opportunity Project — identified Latino outreach as vital weakness in the party’s 
future political prospects and encouraged substantial new efforts to connect to this emerging bloc 
of voters. 
Despite the recent attention given to Latino political participation, however, the group 
continues to punch below its weight in elections, with Latino political influence still falling well 
short the group’s share of the population.  While much of this gap can be explained by lower 
rates of citizenship and younger age distribution among Latinos, it is also partly due to 
historically lower rates of participation among otherwise qualified voters  (Uhlaner, Cain & 
Kiewiet 1989; Shaw, de la Garza & Lee 2000; Cassel 2002; Highton & Burris 2002; Barreto 
2005).  Many studies have argued that lower participation rates among Latinos are simply the 
result of largely fixed demographic and socioeconomic factors (Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980; 
Hero & Campbell 1996; Verba, Schlozman, Brady, & Nie 1993) that fall beyond the control of 
political campaigns or mobilization efforts.  However, Wolfinger, Highton & Mullin (2005) 
show that political reforms to reduce the information cost associated with elections, such as 
ballot pamphlets and postcards with polling station information, can disproportionately affect 
Latinos and boost their turnout.  Cho (1999) similarly find that political socialization can mediate 
how socioeconomic attributes ultimately affect Latino participation. 
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More recent research has identified a number of specific factors that influence Latino 
turnout and that can vary between elections or be directly manipulated by political campaigns.  
First, these studies find that co-ethnicity can play an important mobilizing role, with Latinos 
more likely to turnout when they see the name of a co-ethnic on a ballot (Barreto 2007), when 
they reside in majority-Latino political districts (Barreto, Segura, & Woods 2004), and when 
they are contacted by co-ethnic canvassers (Barreto, Merolla, & Defrancesco Soto 2011; 
Michelson 2005a; Shaw, de la Garza, & Lee 2000).  Second, scholars have also examined the 
importance of the language that campaigns use to deliver their messages to voters (e.g., de la 
Garza & Abrajano 2007; Panagopoulos & Green 2011), although they have come to conflicting 
conclusions.  Observational studies focusing on variation in exposure to campaign advertising 
have found evidence that such ads are most likely to mobilize Latinos when they emphasize 
positive messages and are delivered in Spanish (Barreto, Merolla, & Defrancesco Soto 2011).  
One experimental study, by contrast, concludes that appeals are most successful when they are 
delivered in the language voters speak at home and emphasizes how linguistic context can 
condition the effect of different messages (Abrajano & Panagopoulos 2011).   
 Our study, which reports the results of a field experiment carried out during the June 
2010 primary election in California, contributes to the growing research on the comparative 
effectiveness of mobilization strategies targeting Latino voters.  During the election, we designed 
a direct-mail campaign aimed at increasing turnout among registered Latino voters, with 
variations both in the language of the message and the extent to which it featured a prominent 
co-ethnic elected official supporting the policy.  Unlike much of the existing literature, we focus 
in particular on Latino participation in direct democracy — rather than candidate — elections.  
Drawing on the extent research on the mobilizing effects of co-ethnic candidacy, our experiment 
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examines the extent to which Latino political participation can be encouraged by highlighting 
Latino policy leadership in the context of a ballot initiative election. 
As in the large-scale field experiments on Latino mobilization conducted by Abrajano & 
Panagopoulos (2011), Panagopoulos & Green (2011), Michelson (2006a) and Michelson, Garcia 
Bedolla, & Green (2010), we find that some mobilization strategies work, while others do not 
appear to increase turnout.  These divergent effects provide lessons for the study of ethnic 
political participation — especially with respect to Latinos — and for the design of effective 
mobilization campaigns aimed at boosting Latino political participation.  
   First, we test whether Latino voters are more likely to turn out when they learn that 
policy proposal appearing on their ballot has been sponsored by a prominent Latino elected 
official.  This attempts to extend the logic of Barretto (2007), who shows that the presence of co-
ethnic candidates on the ballot appear to have a mobilizing effect on Latino voters, to contests 
involving policy proposals rather than candidate elections.  We examine if voters respond in the 
same way to a message linking a high-profile Latino leader to a ballot proposition he 
championed.  Our design helps to distinguish whether the mobilizing effects observed in prior 
studies is driven by the prospects of electing a fellow Latino or by broader co-ethnic solidarity.    
 Second, we ask whether Latinos are more responsive to political messages that are 
communicated in the language that they prefer to speak at home.  When campaigns broadcast 
messages — either with broad appeals sent via English-language media outlets or through 
Latino-targeted appeals made in Spanish-language media — they miss the opportunity to match 
a message to a voter’s preferred language.  Abrajano & Panagopoulos’ (2011) field experiment 
suggests that in low-salience elections (such as the June 2010 California Primary that we 
examine) Latinos are most likely to be driven to the polls by English-language messages, with 
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only limited positive effects for Spanish-speaking Latinos, although some observational studies 
point to the opposite conclusion (e.g., Barreto, Merolla, & Defrancesco Soto 2011).  We build on 
these findings by including variation in the elite sponsorship cue together with differences in the 
language of message delivered in our field experiment.  We take advantage of a micro-targeting 
database that includes information about voters’ language preferences to examine whether 
Latinos are more likely to be responsive when campaigns use their preferred language — 
regardless of whether that language is Spanish or English. 
 Our findings show that mobilization efforts can be successful in increasing the 
participation rates of Latino voters, but only under some of the specific conditions suggested by 
past scholarship.  A message encouraging turnout can be effective, although it does not increase 
the turnout homogeneously for Latino voters across the board in our study.  We find that 
matching the language of the message to the language that a voter speaks at home boosts the 
impact of mobilization, but in an asymmetric way.  English-speaking Latinos who received a 
mobilization message in English turned out at a rate that was 2.5 percentage points higher than 
those in the control group, while Spanish-speaking Latinos who received a Spanish-language 
message saw no such boost in turnout.  This is consistent with Abrajano & Panagopoulos’ (2011) 
asymmetric findings.  Among English-speaking Latinos, we find that messages emphasizing 
prominent female leaders prove most effective, but only among female voters.2  
Overall, our findings suggest that well-crafted and targeted GOTV communications can 
yield increases in Latino voter turnout that are as strong as the average mobilization effects 
found in Green & Gerber’s (2008) meta-analysis of similar field experiments.  But many of our 
communications, while showing intriguing patterns, yielded null effects.  This may be because 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Abrajano & Panagopoulos (2011) found that while English-language appeals boosted turnout among all Latinos in 
their sample, the effectiveness of Spanish-language appeals was confined to low-propensity voters and those who 
spoke Spanish at home.	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our tests lack the statistical power to uncover small effects, or the null findings may simply 
highlight the importance of taking into account individual voter attributes to design outreach 
efforts that can successfully increase the political participation of Latino voters.  
The Role of Language and Co-Ethnicity in Mobilizing Latino Voters 
There is little doubt that historically low rates of participation among Latinos can be 
explained in part by the group’s social, political, and economic characteristics.  On average, 
Latinos have lower incomes and levels of educational attainment and Latino voters tend to be 
younger than their white counterparts, two factors that strongly predict the propensity to 
participate in elections (see, e.g., Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995; Wolfinger & Rosenstone 
1980).  In addition, until recent years, Latinos have generally not adopted strong partisan 
identities (Hajnal & Lee 2011), further reducing their incentives to vote (Riker & Ordeshook 
1968).  However, individual and resource-based explanations do not tell the whole story.  One 
reason for why Latino turnout may lag behind that of other ethnic groups is because Latinos are 
simply less likely to be contacted by a campaign or nonpartisan organization to be mobilized to 
participate (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman 1994; Rosenstone & Hansen 1993; Panagopoulos & 
Francia 2009).  Stevens & Bishin (2011) have shown that, even among campaigns and 
independent groups that successfully reach out to Latino voters, these efforts tend to be the least 
personal, and thus less effective.  In randomized field experiments, in-person canvassing tends to 
produce similarly-sized boosts in Latino turnout as those found in studies of mostly white voters 
(Michelson 2003; Ramirez 2005).3   
A related and growing literature has documented that the Latino electorate is most 
effectively mobilized through interaction with other Latinos — whether candidates or campaign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Panagopoulos & Green (2011) also show that nonpartisan radio ads can increase Latino turnout. 	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workers (Barreto 2007; Nuño 2007; Shaw, de la Garza, & Lee 2000).  What factors account for 
the efficacy of co-ethnic candidacy and outreach and explain why both appear to outperform 
generic mobilization tactics pursued by other organizations?  Barreto (2007) argues that co-
ethnic candidates can heighten group-consciousness among Latino voters, increasing the salience 
of their identity and their the expected benefit from voting.4  He also suggests that Latino 
candidates may invest greater campaign effort and resources in the mobilization of co-ethnic 
voters, or do so in a more effectively than is the case among white campaigners. Research on 
majority-minority districts, by contrasts, suggests that Latino candidates — particularly credible 
candidates — can affect the extent to which voters perceive the political system to be legitimate 
and their sense of political efficacy, encouraging participation (Barreto, Segura, & Woods 2004). 
Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
Although existing research has focused primarily on candidate elections, there are few 
theoretical reasons to expect that the hypothesized mechanisms thought to explain the mobilizing 
effects of co-ethnicity are limited to these political contexts. In this study, we examine whether 
political messages emphasizing Latino policy leadership can similarly increase co-ethnic 
solidarity in the context of an initiative campaign and lead to greater participation among Latino 
voters. Our argument is that, just as seeing the name of a Latino candidate on the ballot can 
increase the sense of political empowerment among Latino voters in a regular candidate election, 
learning about the pivotal role played by a Latino policy maker in crafting the proposal on the 
ballot can change voters’ perceptions about both the stakes involved in the election and their 
beliefs about the expressive and instrumental value of their vote. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This is consistent with the McConnaughy, White, Leal, & Casellas (2010) finding that the strength of Latino 
identity becomes a significant predictor among voters when a co-ethnic candidate appears on the ballot.	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To examine the mobilizing potential of co-ethnicity in direct democracy contests, we 
designed and deployed a field experiment during the 2010 California primary election.  In 
addition to varying whether voters were told about the role played by a prominent Latino official 
in crafting one of the proposals that appeared on the statewide ballot, we also assessed the 
importance of the language used to convey the message.  As we discuss above, existing research 
has produced mixed findings on whether Spanish or English messages are most effective in 
Latino outreach.  Thus, we deployed a two-by-two factorial design that allowed us to measure 
the relative effectiveness of our treatments and to identify which exerted the strongest impact on 
turnout. 
In the experiment, we mailed 6,000 postcards to registered Latino voters in San 
Bernardino County, California.  Each postcard described Proposition 14, a top-two primary 
reform initiative authored by Latino Lieutenant Governor Abel Maldonado while he was still 
serving in the State Senate. Crucially, only some postcards described Maldonado’s role in 
crafting the measure, while others stressed the influence of co-author Lois Wolk, a white state 
senator.  A third set of postcards omitted all references to the measure’s authors. Half of the 
postcards delivered the messages in English, while the other half were in Spanish. 
Proposition 14 appeared on the 2010 June primary ballot, an election that featured no 
federal candidates and only one competitive statewide race.5  As in other midterm primary 
elections, overall turnout proved to be low.  Overall, only 33 percent of registered voters (and 24 
percent of eligible voters) cast a ballot (California Secretary of State 2010).  While previous 
experimental work has found that sending postcards is a less effective in mobilizing voters than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The competitive race was the Republican Senatorial primary. The Democratic incumbent senator, Democrat 
Barbara Boxer ran unopposed, and the eventual Democratic nominee for governor, Jerry Brown, also did not face 
any meaningful opposition.  While the Republican gubernatorial primary included multiple candidates, the eventual 
nominee Meg Whitman had a substantial lead over her opponent throughout the campaign.	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in-person canvassing, postcards have been shown to increase turnout, especially in low-salience 
elections that feature minimal campaigning and outreach by campaigns and outside parties (see 
Abrajano & Panagopoulos 2011; Matland & Murray 2010).6  This made the June 2010 primary 
an ideal choice for our experiment. 
In addition to the candidate primaries, the June ballot included five statewide ballot 
measures on subjects ranging from seismic retrofitting of buildings and regulation of local 
electricity providers to several measures dealing with political reform. Our experiment focused 
on Proposition 14, which proposed eliminating the state’s party nominating primary and 
replacing it with a non-partisan top-two primary. Under the proposed system, the top two vote-
getters in each primary contest would face off against each other in the general election, 
regardless of their partisan affiliations. Proposition 14 was described by its proponents as cure 
for the partisan polarization in state government.  Recent research has shown that the degree of 
ideological polarization between Democratic and Republican legislators to be greater in the 
California legislature than in any other state (Shor, Berry, & McCarty 2010). 
Proposition 14 was a legislative constitutional amendment authored by Lieutenant 
Governor Maldonado, a Latino, while he served in the State Senate.  Maldonado represented 
Central California and was one of the few remaining moderate Republicans in the Legislature.  
The measure had been placed on the 2010 ballot by a voting coalition of mostly Democratic 
legislators as a condition for securing Maldonado’s vote on the state budget the year before.  
Maldonado, who had announced his intention to run for the office of lieutenant governor, made 
no secret of his desire for higher office.  Worried about his chances of winning the nomination 
among a primary electorate made up of conservative Republicans, he believed that the top-two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In their study, Matland & Murray (2010) find a 3-percentage point increase from their postcard treatment, similar 
in magnitude to the effect produced in our experiment.	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primary would increase his chances of securing a spot on the ballot in future elections. He was 
appointed to the lieutenant governor’s office in early 2010 by Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
another moderate, to fill a vacancy that was created when the sitting lieutenant governor was 
elected to Congress. 
Maldonado’s nomination to finish the remaining term proved controversial, bringing 
about significant public attention. Because Maldonado would go on to become only the second 
Latino to occupy the high-profile statewide office, his ethnicity was mentioned frequently in the 
media coverage. This publicity, combined with his simultaneous 2010 primary campaign for re-
nomination to the lieutenant governor post along with Maldonado’s authorship of Proposition 14, 
provided us with a unique opportunity to examine the effects of co-ethnicity in direct democracy 
elections.7 
Our experiment manipulated two key treatments: the language used to deliver the 
message on the postcards and the identity of the author of the ballot measure. Drawing on the full 
list of 40,315 registered Latino voters living in households without any other registrants, we 
randomly assigned each to one of six treatment conditions or to the control group.  We mailed 
postcards to 1,000 registered voters in each of the six treatment groups. All postcards provided 
encouragement to vote in the election and included statements in favor and against Proposition 
14, both drawn from the official ballot pamphlet.  One version of the postcard, mailed to 2,000 
voters (1,000 in English and 1,000 in Spanish), indicated that Proposition 14 had been authored 
by Lt. Governor Abel Maldonado. Another variant of the postcards, also sent to 1,000 voters in 
both English and Spanish, was identical except that it omitted the discussion of the measure’s 
authorship. To separate the effects of co-ethnic policy leadership from that of simply 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 While Michelson (2006b) examines Latino mobilization as part of a campaign on behalf of a ballot measure in 
Arizona, she does not focus on the role of co-ethnicity as a mobilization strategy.	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personalizing the message by identifying a specific legislator, a final treatment was identical to 
the first but indicated that Proposition 14 had been written by state Senator Lois Wolk, a white 
female legislator and one of Maldonado’s co-authors. To ensure that Latinos would clearly 
identify Maldonado as a co-ethnic for Latinos, we ran a pilot survey with a group of 
undergraduate students. The survey showed clearly that self-identified Latino respondents 
overwhelmingly knew that Maldonado was Latino (88.9%) and that Wolk was not (none of the 
Latino and Latina students misidentified Wolk as a Latina).8  Samples of the postcard noting the 
key elements that were randomly manipulated in the experiment can be found in Appendix A. 
 The experiment was conducted in San Bernardino County, a suburban county east of Los 
Angeles with a heavy Latino presence.  We chose San Bernardino because it is one of the few 
counties in California with a large number of registered Latino voters but relatively few Filipino 
voters, increasing our ability to use surname analysis to identify the ethnicity of our subjects.  
We procured a micro-targeting database containing the names of all Latino voters in the county 
from a nationally reputable commercial vendor.9 The database contained voters’ prior vote 
history and other relevant information, including language preferences.   
Our design allowed us to test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. Messages emphasizing co-ethnic policy leadership increase Latino turnout 
to a greater extent than messages that do not feature co-ethnic cues. 
The hypothesis is an extension of Barreto’s (2007) finding that Latino turnout is higher 
when a co-ethnic candidate appears on the ballot and related studies showing that co-ethnic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The sample of undergraduates from which these data are drawn was surveyed in 2010 and included 178 students at 
a large public university, with 15.16% self-identifying as Latino.	  9	  The	  ethnicity	  of	  voters	  was	  identified	  by	  the	  vendor	  using	  a	  proprietary	  algorithm	  that	  includes	  the	  voters’	  first	  names,	  last	  names,	  and	  areas	  of	  residency.	  Surname	  matching	  is	  based	  on	  the	  U.S.	  Census	  lists.	  	  Any	  errors	  in	  surname	  matching	  would	  be	  randomly	  distributed	  across	  experimental	  conditions,	  which	  could	  result	  in	  inflated	  standard	  errors,	  but	  would	  not	  bias	  the	  estimated	  coefficients.	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contact is particularly effective in mobilizing Latino voters.  We hypothesize that a similar 
mechanisms — increased group consciousness and heightened sense of political empowerment 
— could boost minority voter turnout in an election featuring ballot propositions if campaigns or 
the civic debate focuses on the proposition’s author and highlight the pivotal role played by 
prominent minority leaders.  If a co-ethnic sponsorship cue produces a mobilizing effect in direct 
democracy elections, then minority voters who receive information about a co-ethnic leader’s 
authorship of a proposition will be more likely to turn out.  
We test this hypothesis by informing a random sample of Latino voters via postcard 
about Maldonado’s authorship of Proposition 14. Marginally higher turnout among this group 
compared to other treatment conditions would provide evidence that the mobilizing effects of 
ethnic solidarity can extend to direct democracy elections.       
Hypothesis 2. Latino voters are most responsive to messages received in their dominant 
language. 
Barreto, Merolla, & Defrancesco Soto (2011) provide observational findings to show that 
campaign messages delivered in Spanish appear to be produce larger mobilizing effects among 
Latino voters than English advertising.  By contrast, experimental evidence by Abrajano & 
Panagopoulos (2011) instead suggests that English-language outreach is most effective in 
boosting participation, although they find smaller Spanish-language effects among some Spanish 
speakers.  Our design, which randomizes the language used on the postcards, allows us to test 
these competing expectations.  First, we examine whether Latino voters are more effectively 
mobilized by campaign material that is delivered in Spanish rather than in English.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Research	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  advertising	  and	  marketing	  has	  suggested	  that	  Spanish-­‐language	  advertising	  may	  win	  over	  Latinos	  by	  indicating	  “the	  advertiser’s	  respect	  for	  the	  Latino	  culture”	  (Koslow,	  Shamdasani,	  &	  Touchstone	  1994,	  p.	  576)	  and	  has	  shown	  Spanish	  to	  be	  the	  more	  “emotional”	  language	  (Valdes	  &	  Seohane	  1995).	  	  Some	  researchers,	  by	  contrast,	  have	  argued	  that	  using	  Spanish-­‐language	  outreach	  to	  contact	  English-­‐
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Our primary expectation, however, most closely follows Abrajano & Panagopoulos 
(2011) in that we expect that individual voters’ language preferences will condition the effects of 
our treatments, with the biggest increase in turnout among respondents who receive a message in 
the language that matches the one they use most.  That is, we predict that English-dominant 
Latinos are more likely to be mobilized by English, rather than Spanish postcards, and vice 
versa.  We test this expectation by combining our randomized treatment assignment with 
information from a commercial micro-targeting database, which includes information on the 
voters’ primary language. 
Experimental Results 
 Random assignment of treatments to study participants helps ensure that all of the 
experimental groups are balanced on both observable and unobservable characteristics that may 
be correlated with the outcome variable of interest – turnout. For our study, Table 1 confirms the 
randomization procedures we employed yielded experimental groups in which relevant traits 
were evenly distributed. Table 1 shows that prior voting (in the 2006 and 2008 general elections) 
and language preferences were balanced across the experimental conditions. Having confirmed 
the randomization was successful, we can proceed to analyze the experimental results.  
[Table 1 here] 
 Following the June 2010 election, we obtained validated voter turnout data from the 
official San Bernardino County voter file. At the individual level, the voting records report only 
whether each voter cast a ballot in the election, but do not separately record whether voters 
completed the portion of the ballot corresponding to specific candidate contests or initiatives.  
Given the nature of the voter records, our dependent variable is necessarily a dichotomous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  dominant	  Latinos	  can	  produce	  “[a]	  direct	  negative	  effect	  on	  affect	  toward	  the	  advertisement	  due	  to	  language-­‐related	  inferiority	  complexes”	  (Koslow,	  Shamdasani	  &	  Touchstone	  1994,	  p.	  577).	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indicator for whether each voter participated in the June primary election.  Table 2 reports the 
turnout rates for subjects assigned to each treatment condition. The control group in the 
experiment voted at a rate of 15.2 percent.  
Turnout among voters assigned to receive the English-language postcard with no 
authorship cue was only slightly higher (16.0 percent), suggesting a modest turnout boost of 0.8 
percentage points (SE=1.2). Subjects assigned to receive the English-language Maldonado 
treatment voted at a rate of 15.3 percent, implying a negligible intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of 0.1 
percentage points (SE=1.2). The largest boost in turnout we observe in among those assigned to 
receive the English-language Wolk treatment, who voted at a rate 16.3 (SE=1.2), implying a 
bump of 1.0 percentage points relative to the control group.  
Among subjects assigned to receive postcards in Spanish, the authorless treatment failed 
to elevate turnout; the voting rate for this group was 13.2 percent, fully 2.0 percentage points 
(S.E.=1.2) lower than that control group. Similarly, subjects assigned to receive the Spanish-
language Wolk treatment voted a rate of 14.7 percent, 0.5 percentage points lower than the 
control (S.E.=1.2). The Spanish-language, Maldonado treatment produced a modest turnout 
boost of 0.2 percentage points (S.E.=1.2). When we focus on language alone, regardless of 
sponsorship cues, turnout among subjects assigned to receive postcards in Spanish was 0.8 
percentage points lower than for the control group (S.E.=0.7), while turnout for those assigned to 
receive postcards in English was 0.7 percentage points higher than the control group (S.E.=0.7). 
When we examine the impact of the message cues regardless of language use, we find turnout 
among those received no authorship cue was 0.6 percentage points (S.E.=0.8) lower, relative to 
the control group, while those assigned to receive the Maldonado treatment voted at a rate that 
was 0.1 percentage points higher (S.E.=0.8), and those assigned to be treated with the Wolk 
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treatment 0.3 percentage points higher (S.E.=0.8), compared to the control group. Overall, these 
initial results, none of which reach conventional levels of statistical significance, show that the 
postcards did not appear to affect voting rates when their impacts are averaged across all groups 
of voters. 
[Table 2 here] 
 Randomized field experiments can allay concerns about external validity because they 
are conducted under natural conditions. In such a scenario, however, successful contact with 
subjects assigned to treatment groups is not guaranteed. Notwithstanding our efforts to expose all 
subjects assigned to the treatment conditions to the stimulus, some subjects were not successfully 
contacted because their postcards were returned as undeliverable. The contact rates for each of 
our six treatment conditions are presented in Table 2. On average, we succeeded in contacting 
92.3 percent of our targeted subjects. We find no significant differences in the contact rates 
across our treatment conditions. To obtain an accurate estimate of the direct effect of contact, it 
is necessary to divide the intent-to-treat effects described above by the contact rate. Table 2 
therefore also reports the average treatment-on-treated effects (ATT), which adjust the initial 
estimates to take into account the actual contact rate.  
 This is essentially equivalent to performing a two-stage least squares regression of vote 
on actual contact using the treatment assignment variables as instrumentals (Angrist, Imbens & 
Rubin 1996; Gerber & Green 2005). Assignment to treatment conditions is a perfect instrument 
for contact because assignment causes contact but is independent of other causes of voting 
behavior. This estimator also permits the additional inclusion of control variables to correct for 
potential imbalances between experimental groups due to chance.   
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 Table 3 reports the results of a series of two-stage least squares regression analyses in 
which individual turnout is regressed on actual contact and random assignment is the 
instrumental variable.11 We estimate two separate models for each set of analyses. The first 
model expresses individual voter turnout as a linear function of each voters’ receipt of each 
postcard, instrumented by their assignment to the treatment conditions. The results from models, 
in which turnout for each voter is regressed on dummy variables corresponding to the various 
treatments (the reference category is the control group), are presented in columns 1, 3 and 5. 
Note that each treatment variable represents actual contact instrumented by random assignment. 
The second model is augmented to include covariates for prior voting described above. The 
inclusion of covariates is not necessary, but it may reduce the disturbance variance and improve 
the statistical precision of the estimated treatment effects. We present results of our models with 
covariates in columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 3. 
 [Table 3 here] 
 The regression results parallel our initial findings. The estimations reveal no significant 
average treatment effects (using one-tailed tests) that are consistent with our hypotheses. The 
inclusion of covariates changes the estimates of the treatment effects only trivially, as expected. 
One possible explanation for these results is that the treatments affected various voters 
differently. Such heterogeneity could mask effects for specific subgroups of voters. As we 
outlined above, there are clear theoretical reasons to expect that language preference may have 
conditioned the impact of our treatments. We explore this possibility next.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  This	  approach	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  accounting	  for	  noncompliance	  —	  in	  our	  case,	  failed	  contact.	  	  One	  disadvantage,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  conventional	  corrections	  used	  to	  adjust	  the	  standard	  errors	  in	  the	  two-­‐stage	  process,	  which	  we	  use	  here,	  does	  not	  account	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  our	  treatment	  and	  outcome	  variables	  are	  binary.	  	  However,	  Angrist	  (1991)	  provides	  Monte	  Carlo	  evidence	  that	  linear	  estimators	  perform	  nearly	  as	  well	  as	  correctly	  specified	  maximum	  likelihood	  estimators	  in	  these	  contexts.	  	  To	  examine	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  our	  results	  to	  this	  modeling	  choice,	  we	  also	  re-­‐estimated	  the	  main	  models	  using	  a	  logit	  link	  function	  in	  a	  single-­‐stage	  regression	  without	  instrumental	  variables.	  	  This	  did	  not	  change	  any	  of	  the	  significance	  levels	  or	  the	  substantive	  conclusions.	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Heterogeneous Treatment Effects among Key Subgroups 
 It is reasonable to expect that specific voter attributes may have mediated the impact of 
our interventions, resulting in heterogeneous treatment effects across key subgroups. We 
therefore investigated a series of interactions to examine these possibilities. Below we focus on 
interactions between the treatments and subjects’ primary language.12 We present these findings 
in Tables 4. For the sake of space, we do not report models with the covariates described above 
in Table 4, although the results are virtually identical when covariates are included (data 
available upon request).  
[Table 4 here] 
 We turn first to the question of language preference. Using data obtained from a 
commercial vendor about subjects’ primary language, we examine whether the impact of our 
treatments is conditional on whether subjects are English- or Spanish-dominant.13 We expect that 
the English-language treatment will exert a stronger impact on voters who are English-dominant, 
compared to the Spanish-language treatment and vice versa.14 The results suggest there is some 
heterogeneity in the impact of the treatments. The English-language treatments overall elevated 
turnout among English-dominant Latinos by 2.5 percentage points (S.E.=1.3). This effect is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Based on work by Arceneaux & Nickerson (2009) and Matland & Murray (2010) we also tested whether the 
effectiveness of mobilization messages is conditioned by a voters’ existing propensity to turn out to vote. We found 
no evidence of such effects for our treatments.	  
13 We acknowledge there may be some measurement error associated with this indicator.  However, it is the best 
information available at the individual level. The vendor has compiled this information from a variety of sources, 
and it is commonly used for commercial purposes,. We note that since the experimental samples were assigned at 
random, the distribution of language dominance, as well as any error associated with the measure we employ, will 
be randomly and uniformly distributed in our samples (see Table 1 for confirmation). Data on bilingualism was not 
available.  	  
14 Language dominance has been used as a proxy for acculturation in previous studies (DeFrancesco Soto & Merolla 
2008). We do not dispute these claims but remain largely agnostic about the underlying mechanisms by which 
language dominance exerts effects. We accept that language dominance may reflect ones’ degree of acculturation or 
simply be a language measure. Thus, the mechanism driving differences in language effectiveness may be simply 
language comprehension or some deeper psychological process relating to acculturation.	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statistically significant at the p<.05 level using a one-tailed test and consistent with previous 
studies (Abrajano & Panagopoulos 2011). The Spanish-language treatments, however, failed to 
increase turnout.  These results provide some support for our prediction, taken from Hypothesis 
2, that mobilization methods are more effective when delivered in a voter’s preferred language, 
at least with respect to English-dominant Latinos, but we also detect the same puzzling 
asymmetry between the language effects that is generally consistent with patterns reported in 
Abrajano & Panagopoulos (2011).  
Turning next the prediction in Hypothesis 1 that co-ethnic elite cues should mobilize 
Latino voters, we focus attention on the different messages featured on the postcards mailed to 
voters.  We find that the postcards containing the Wolk sponsorship message raised turnout by 
2.2 percentage points among English-dominant Latinos (S.E.=1.6; significant at the p<.05 level 
using a one-tailed test), compared to the control condition but none of the other cues exerted 
significant effects for either subgroup of voters. The estimates also reveal the English-language 
Wolk treatment effectively boosted turnout among English-dominant Latinos by 4.8 percentage 
points (S.E.=2.3), an effect that is not only statistically significant at the p<.01 level, but also 
substantively meaningful.  Typical postcard mailings of this sort boosts turnout by 0.5 
percentage points on average (Green & Gerber 2008); the magnitude of the effect we detect for 
the English/Wolk treatment among English-dominant Latinos is nearly ten times greater than the 
average effect for mailings like these. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, however, we fail to detect any 
effects for the Maldonado message corresponding to the predicted mobilization produced by co-
ethnic policy sponsorship, regardless of subjects’ language preferences.  
One possible explanation for the surprising efficacy of the Wolk treatment is the gender 
composition of our sample: women outnumbered men by more than 10 percentage points.  To 
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understand if the Wolk treatment is being driven by the behavior of female respondents — who 
may be differentially mobilized by a message emphasizing the leadership role played by a 
prominent female legislator in placing Proposition 14 on the ballot — we examined whether 
there is a significant interaction effect between assignment to this treatment group and voter 
gender.  The results from these models are reported in Appendix B.  Consistent with the gender 
leadership explanation, we found that the English Wolk effect was large and significant only for 
English-dominant female voters.  It was substantively small and insignificant among male voters.  
We found no gender subgroup effects among Spanish-dominant voters. 
Discussion 
This study asks how Latino voters respond to GOTV direct-democracy campaigns that 
emphasize policy leadership exercised by prominent co-ethnic leaders and mobilization 
messages delivered in different languages.  We also examine whether effectiveness of such 
outreach is mediated by the type of voter targeted by campaigns. Answering these questions can 
yield important lessons both for the study of minority voting behavior and for mobilization 
campaigns aimed at increasing voter turnout among specific demographic subgroups. The 
familiar advantages of field experiments, in which voters are randomly assigned to receive 
contact and through which messages can be finely tuned, can help to supplement the lessons of 
past observational studies. Because we directly manipulate the delivery of co-ethnic sponsorship 
cues and the language in which the message is delivered, we can make clear causal inferences 
about the presence and magnitude of these effects.  Using a rich, individual-level micro-targeting 
database gives us the chance to see which types of voters are more responsive to particular 
appeals.  Randomized GOTV experiments targeted at groups that traditionally participate in 
elections at low rates not only sharpen our social science inferences about minority voting 
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behavior; they also help to identify the comparative effectiveness of alternative mobilization 
methods, information that is of interest both to political operatives and others interested in 
reducing longstanding inequities in political participation (Ramirez 2005; Michelson, Garcia 
Bedolla & McConnell 2009; Michelson, Garcia Bedolla & Green 2010). 
 In the end, this experiment leaves us with somewhat of a mixed picture regarding the 
main hypotheses we advance in this paper. We find little evidence that Latino registered voters 
responded to the co-ethnic cue informing them that Latino Lt. Governor Abel Maldonado had 
authored one of the propositions up for a vote in the June, 2010 primary.  This mobilization 
message was not more effective than postcards listing a white co-author or omitting all 
authorship information.  While our results suggest that the findings from candidate elections may 
not translate to direct democracy — providing evidence that policy leadership does not produce 
the same sense of in-group solidarity or political efficacy as the candidacy of co-ethnics — it is 
important to recognize several alternative explanations for this null finding.  First, information 
about Abel Maldonado’s role in crafting Proposition 14 may not have provided the strongest 
possible co-ethnic policy leadership message. As a Republican, Maldonado does not share the 
party affiliation of most California Latino voters.  Indeed, in the November 2010 general 
election, when Maldonado faced off against his Democratic opponent Gavin Newsom, slightly 
more Latinos backed Newsom for the lieutenant governors post (DiCamillo & Field 2010).15  To 
explore the potential importance of partisanship, we analyzed the results separately for registered 
Democrats, independents, and (a much smaller subset) of Republican participants.  We did not, 
however, find stronger evidence of co-ethnic mobilization among the latter subgroup. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  There	  is	  mixed	  empirical	  evidence	  for	  whether	  ethnicity	  trumps	  partisanship	  as	  a	  determinant	  of	  Latino	  vote-­‐choice.	  	  While	  Michelson	  (2005b)	  finds	  partisanship	  to	  be	  the	  more	  important	  consideration,	  Hill,	  Moreno,	  &	  Cue	  (2001)	  reach	  the	  opposite	  conclusion.	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Second, any potential treatment effect might have been so small that it went undetected 
by a test that relied on 2,000 postcards – which have weaker mobilizing effects than other GOTV 
treatments – for its statistical power.  We suspect, however, that these difficult-to-detect effects 
would be of much smaller practical and substantive importance to both campaign professionals 
and democratic theorists. 
However, we do find evidence that the language used to deliver mobilization messages 
matters. We show that that English outreach can effectively mobilize English-dominant Latinos, 
but that neither these nor Spanish-language appeals generally boosted participation among 
Spanish-dominant Latinos. The fact that the Wolk treatment effectively motivated English-
dominant Latino females but not others suggests that the level of Latinos’ acculturation and 
gender cues both play important roles in shaping political behavior and can mediate Latino 
voters’ responsiveness to campaign communications.  The results highlight the challenges 
campaigns and nonpartisan groups face in mobilizing Spanish-dominant Latinos, suggesting that 
simply varying the language of their outreach efforts will not be sufficient to increase political 
participation for this difficult-to-reach group.  Thus, successfully mobilizing Spanish-speaking 
voters will likely require more time-intensive and context-specific efforts — perhaps by taking 
advantage of these voters’ social networks and existing community organizations active in these 
communities. 
Another consideration is the nature of message we conveyed to voters. Abrajano & 
Panagopoulos (2011) used a social pressure message, shown by Gerber, Green & Larimer (2008) 
to be an effective method to stimulate turnout. Our postcards simply provided information to 
potential voters.  The absence of consistent mobilization effects across all languages may suggest 
that information-based appeals simply do not work as effectively as social pressure messages.  
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Most importantly, however, our findings about the relative effectiveness of English messages 
compared to the Spanish treatments challenge existing observational findings on the mobilizing 
impact of campaign advertising, documenting the importance of turning to randomized field 
experiments make credible causal inferences. 
 In all, our study tests two strategies for mobilizing Latino voters, and finds that one of 
them proved effective.  Our experiment shows that matching the language of the GOTV message 
with the language preferred by the voter who received it is critical, at least for Latinos whose 
primary language is English.  First, this heterogeneous effect emphasizes important differences 
within the Latino community — differences that are easily overlooked by campaigns making 
bulk ad buys and scholars of political behavior who study aggregate outcomes.  It is conceivable 
that some Latinos in some circumstances may respond to Spanish-language appeals, but in other 
conditions, others may be more responsive to English-language messages.  Campaigns that 
ignore this dynamic and treat Latino voters as a monolith do so at their peril.  Second, from a 
practical vantage point, our findings point to the potential importance of new “microtargetting” 
datasets which, because they contain voters’ language preferences and other demographic 
information, including gender, can be an effective part of any mobilization campaigning.  In 
sum, this experiment lends support for some of our expectations but fails to provide support for 
other contentions we advance.  Nonetheless, the intriguing possibilities raised by this work beg 
further exploration and identify one potentially fruitful route toward mobilizing Latino voters 
and suggest that both scholars campaign professionals will be well served in designing 
interventions that account for important individual differences in targeted population groups.  
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Table 1: Relationships between Treatment Group Assignment and Select Covariates (Mean 
Levels) 
 
    Voted   Voted   English- Language 
    2006  2008  Dominant Preference  
(%)  (%)  (%)  Missing (%) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
English/No Authorship 34.1  63.5  40.6  12.6 
English/Maldonado  36.7  66.1  37.8  11.9 
English/Wolk   34.6  63.0  42.1  12.3 
Spanish/ No Authorship 31.6  63.5  41.5  11.9 
Spanish/Maldonado  32.2  64.5  39.2  11.8 
Spanish/Wolk  33.2  64.2  41.2  12.5 
Control   33.6  63.5  39.1  12.0 
Prob>F a   .27  .75  .22  .99 
N    40,315  40,315  35,456  40,315 
NOTES: Figures in columns represent mean percentages unless otherwise indicated. 
 
a Test statistics generated using one way ANOVA to evaluate whether mean turnout levels differ across categories of 
random assignment. In all cases, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal means at standard significance levels 
(p<.05), implying balance across groups.    
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Table 2: Experimental Results 
 	  	   	   	   	   Voted   Intent-to- Contact  Average 
    (June 2010) Treat   Rate  Treatment 
    (%)  Effect  (%)  Effect 
Treatments     (ITT)    (ATT) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
English/ No Authorship 16.0  +.8  92.7  +.9 
English/Maldonado  15.3  +.1  94.5  +.1 
English/Wolk   16.3  +1.1  93.0  +1.2 
Spanish/ No Authorship 13.2  -2.0  92.7  -2.2 
Spanish/Maldonado  15.3  +.1  94.3  +.1 
Spanish/Wolk  14.7  -.5  92.5  -.5 
Control   15.2      
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Table 3: Estimates of the Effects of Six Mail Treatments on Voter Turnout in the June 2010 
California Primary Election 
 
Treatments  Model Specification  
Spanish -.008 
(.008) 
-.007 
(.007)  
    
English  .007   
(.007) 
.003   
(.007) 
    
Maldonado    .001   
(.009) 
-.004 
(.008) 
  
Wolk    .003   
(.009) 
.003   
(.008) 
  
No Author   -.006  
(.009) 
-.005 
(.008) 
  
English/Maldonado      .001   
(.012) 
-.009 
(.011) 
English/Wolk      .012   
(.013) 
.011   
(.012) 
English/ No Author     .009   
(.013) 
.008   
(.012) 
Spanish/Maldonado      .001   
(.012) 
.002   
(.011) 
Spanish/Wolk      -.005  
(.012) 
-.006  
(.011) 
Spanish/ No Author     -.021 
(.012) 
-.018 
(.011) 
N of individuals 40,315 40,315 40,315 40,315 40,315 40,315 
Covariatesa No Yes No Yes No Yes 
RMSE .359 .331 .359 .331 .359 .331 
 
NOTES: aCovariates: Voting in the 2006 and 2008 general elections. Estimates derived from 2SLS using treatment 
assignment as an instrument for successful treatment. Dependent variable is voter turnout in the 2010 primary 
election. Robust cluster standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 4: Estimates of the Effects of Six Mail Treatments on Voter Turnout in the June 2010 
California Primary Election by Dominant Language 
 
Treatments  Model Specification  
 English-
Dominant 
Spanish-
Dominant 
English-
Dominant 
Spanish-
Dominant 
English-
Dominant 
Spanish-
Dominant 
Spanish -.007 
(.013) 
-.013 
(.009) 
    
English .025** 
(.013) 
.002   
(.010) 
    
Maldonado   .018   
(.016) 
-.003 
(.012) 
  
Wolk   .022* 
(.016) 
-.010 
(.012) 
  
No Author   -.013 
(.015) 
-.003 
(.012) 
  
English/Maldonado     .015   
(.022) 
.009   
(.016) 
English/Wolk     .048** 
(.023) 
-.010 
(.016) 
English/No Author     .010   
(.022) 
.008   
(.017) 
Spanish/Maldonado     .021   
(.023) 
-.013   
(.015) 
Spanish/Wolk     -.005 
(.021) 
-.010 
(.016) 
Spanish/No Author     -.035 
(.020) 
-.014 
(.016) 
N of individuals 13,941 21,515 13,941 21,515 13,941 21,515 
RMSE .378 .348 .378 .348 .378 .348 
 
NOTES: Estimates derived from 2SLS using treatment assignment as an instrument for successful treatment. 
Dependent variable is voter turnout in the 2010 primary election. Robust cluster standard errors in parentheses. 
Using one-tailed tests, * signifies p<.05 and ** signifies p<.01. All models exclude covariates. 
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Appendix A: Treatment Postcards 
 
[English version] 
 
 
 
Don’t Miss Your Chance to Vote on Tuesday, June 8th! 
 
Your vote counts on Prop. 14,  
a constitutional amendment [on your ballot/put on your ballot by Lt. Governor 
Abel Maldonado/put on your ballot by State Senator Lois Wolk]. 
 
 
  PRO 
A YES vote means YOU will 
be able to vote for any 
candidate you wish for state 
and congressional offices, 
regardless of political party 
preference. Experts say non-
partisan measures like 
Proposition 14 will result in 
elected representatives in 
Sacramento and Washington 
who are LESS PARTISAN and 
MORE PRACTICAL.  	  
CON 
The politicians behind 
Proposition 14 included a 
deceptive provision, that 
won’t make primaries 
“Open” at all. Candidates 
will no longer be required to 
list their party affiliation on 
the ballot. They want to look 
like “independents” while 
they actually remain in their 
political party. Business as 
usual disguised as “reform.” 
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[Spanish version] 
 
¡No pierdas la oportunidad de votar el martes 8 de junio! 
 
Tu voto cuenta sobre Proposición 14, una enmienda constitucional [en tu boleta 
electoral/ en la boleta electoral por el Vicegobernador Abel Maldonado/ en la boleta 
electoral por la Senadora Estatal Lois Wolk]. 
 
 
  A FAVOR 
Un voto SÍ significa que USTED 
podrá votar por cualquier 
candidato que desee para 
cargos estatales y del 
congreso, independientemente 
de su preferencia de partido 
político. Los expertos dicen que 
las medidas no partidarias 
como la Propuesta 14 
resultarán en representantes 
electos en Sacramento y en 
Washington MENOS 
PARTIDARIOS y MÁS 
PRÁCTICOS. 
EN CONTRA 
Los politicos detrás de la 
Propuesta 14 incluyeron una 
disposición engañosa que no 
hará que las primarias sean 
“Abiertas” para nada. Los 
candidatos ya no tendrán que 
indicar su afiliación partidaria 
en la balota. Quieren 
aparentar ser 
“independientes”, cuando en 
realidad permanecen en sus 
partidos políticos. Las cosas 
como siempre disfrazadas de 
“reforma”.	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Appendix B: Additional Subgroup Analysis 
 
Table B1: Treatment Effects by Partisan Identification 
  
Treatments 
Democratic 
Registrant 
 
Republican 
Registrant 
 
Decline to 
State/Other 
 
English/Maldonado  .020 
(.018) 
-.009 
(.024) 
-.036 
(.017) 
English/Wolk  .004 
(.018) 
.034 
(.027) 
.013 
(.022) 
English/ No Author .020 
(.018) 
.004 
(.026) 
-.008 
(.020) 
Spanish/Maldonado  .023 
(.019) 
-.044 
(.021) 
.011 
(.022) 
Spanish/Wolk  -.016 
(.017) 
-.015 
(.024) 
.029 
(.025) 
Spanish/ No Author -.036 
(.017) 
.008 
(.024) 
-.024 
(.019) 
N of individuals 20,886 10,900 40,315 
Covariatesa No Yes No 
RMSE .381 .361 .359 
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Table B2: Treatment Effects by Partisan Identification and Language Preference 
    
 
English-Dominant Spanish-Dominant 
Treatments 
Democratic 
Registrant 
 
Republican 
Registrant 
 
Democratic 
Registrant 
 
Republican 
Registrant 
 
English/Maldonado  .051 
(.034) 
-.004 
(.041) 
.006 
(.021) 
-.012 
(.029) 
English/Wolk  .042 
(.032) 
.063 
(.047) 
-.019 
(.021) 
.013 
(.032) 
English/ No Author -.004 
(.031) 
.052 
(.050) 
.033 
(.023) 
-.021 
(.030) 
Spanish/Maldonado  .024 
(.033) 
-.038 
(.040) 
.022 
(.023) 
-.045 
(.024) 
Spanish/Wolk  -.023 
(.030) 
.014 
(.044) 
-.012 
(.021) 
-.033 
(.028) 
Spanish/ No Author -.063 
(.029) 
.002 
(.004) 
-.023 
(.020) 
.010 
(.030) 
N of individuals 7,080 3,952 13,806 6,948 
Covariatesa No Yes No Yes 
RMSE .399 .383 .371 .347 
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Table B3: Treatment Effects by Gender and Language Preference 
    
 
English-Dominant Spanish-Dominant 
Treatments 
Men 
 
Women 
 
Men 
 
Women 
 
English/Maldonado  .044 
(.038) 
-.001 
(.027) 
-.008 
(.020) 
-.004 
(.020) 
English/Wolk  .009 
(.037) 
.072* 
(.030) 
.000 
(.022) 
-.022 
(.002) 
English/ No Author .009 
(.040) 
.012 
(.026) 
.008 
(.022) 
.007 
(.022) 
Spanish/Maldonado  .043 
(.039) 
.004 
(.028) 
-.020 
(.020) 
.000 
(.019) 
Spanish/Wolk  -.000 
(.039) 
-.008 
(.025) 
.039 
(.024) 
-.048 
(.018) 
Spanish/ No Author -.022 
(.037) 
-.042 
(.023) 
-.002 
(.022) 
-.023 
(.018) 
N of individuals 5,155 8,786 12,734 13,640 
Covariatesa No No No Yes 
RMSE .402 .361 .350 .347 
 
	   32	  
  
References 
Abrajano, M. & Panagopoulos, C.  (2011). “Does language matter? The impact of Spanish 
versus English-language GOTV efforts on Latino turnout.” American Politics Research. 
39(4), pp. 643-663. 
Angrist, J.D.  (1991).  “Instrumental variables estimation of average treatment effects in 
econometrics and epidemiology.”  National Bureau of Economic Research Technical 
Working Paper No. 115. 
Angrist, J.D., Imbens, G.W., & Rubin, D.B.  (1996).  “Identification of causal effects using 
instrumental variables.”  Journal of the American Statistical Association 91(434), pp. 
444-455. 
Arceneaux, K., & Nickerson, D.W.  (2009).  “Who is mobilized to vote?  A re-analysis of eleven 
randomized field experiments.”  American Journal of Political Science 53(1), pp. 1-16. 
Barreto, M.A., Segura, G.M., & Woods, N.D.  (2004).  “The mobilizing effect of majority-
minority districts on Latino turnout.”  American Political Science Review 98(1), pp. 65-75. 
Barreto, M.A. (2005). “Latino immigrants at the polls: foreign born voter turnout in the 2002 
election.” Political Research Quarterly 58(1), pp. 79–86. 
Barreto, M.A.  (2007).  “¡Si Se Puede! Latino candidates and the mobilization of Latino voters.”  
American Political Science Review 101(3), pp. 425-441. 
Barreto, M.A., & Nuño, S.A.  (2011).  “The effectiveness of coethnic contact on Latino political 
recruitment.”  Political Research Quarterly. 64(2), pp. 448-459. 
Barreto, M.A., Merolla, J., & Soto, D.F.  (2011).  “Multiple dimensions of mobilization: the 
effect of direct contact and political ads on Latino turnout in the 2000 presidential 
election.”  Journal of Political Marketing 10(4), pp. 303-327. 
	   33	  
Brady, H.E., Verba, S., & Schlozman, K.L.  (1994).  “Beyond SES: a resource model of political 
participation.”  American Political Science Review 89(2), pp. 271-294. 
California Secretary of State.  (2010).  Statement of the vote: June 8, 2010, statewide direct 
primary election. Sacramento, CA: California Secretary of State. 
Cassel, C.A. (2002). “Hispanic turnout: estimates from validated voting data.” Political Research 
Quarterly 55(2), pp. 391-408. 
DiCamillo, M., and Field, M.  (2010).  “Newsom holds narrow five-point lead over Maldonado 
in Lt. Governor’s race.  Cooley just one point ahead of Harris in race for Attorney 
General.”  Press release, available at: http://field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rls2364.pdf. 
Gerber, A.S., Green, D.P., & Larimer, C.W. (2008).  “Social pressure and voter turnout: 
evidence from a large-scale field experiment.” American Political Science Review 102(1), 
pp. 33-48. 
Green, D.P., & Gerber, A.S.  (2005).  “Field experimentation.”  In Encyclopedia of Social 
Measurement, Volume 2, Kempf-Leonard, K. (ed.).  New York: Academic Press.  
Green, D.P. & Gerber, A.S. (2008). Get Out the Vote, Second Edition: How to Increase Voter 
Turnout. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.  
de La Garza, R.O, Abrajano, M.A., & Cortina, J.  (2007). “Get me to the polls on time: co-ethnic 
mobilization and Latino turnout.” In Junn, J., & Haynie, K.L. (eds.), New race politics: 
Understanding minority and immigrant politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hero, R.E., & Campbell, A.G. (1996). “Understanding Latino political participation: exploring 
the evidence from the Latino National Political Survey.” Hispanic Journal of Behavioral 
Sciences 18(2), pp. 129-141. 
	   34	  
Hajnal, Z.L, & Lee, T. (2011). Why Americans don’t join the party: race, immigration, and the 
failure (of political parties) to engage the electorate. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
of Press.  
Highton, B., & Burris, A.L. (2002). “New perspectives on Latino voter turnout in the United 
States.” American Politics Research 30(3), pp. 285-306. 
Hill, K.A., Moreno, D.V., & Cue, L.  (2001).  “Racial and partisan voting in a tri-ethnic city: The 
1996 Dade County mayoral election.”  Journal of Urban Affairs 23(3-4), pp. 291-307. 
Koslow, S., Shamdasani, P.N., & Touchstone, E.E.  (1994).  “Exploring language effects in 
ethnic advertising: a sociolinguistic perspective.”  Journal of Consumer Research 20(4), 
pp. 575-585. 
Matland, R.E., & Murray, G.R.  (2012).  “An experimental test of mobilization effects in a 
Latino community.” Political Research Quarterly 65(1), pp. 192-205. 
McConnaughy, C.M., White, I.S., Leal, D.L., & Casellas, J.P.  (2010).  “A Latino on the ballot: 
explaining coethnic voting among Latinos and the response of white Americans.”  
Journal of Politics 72(4), pp. 1199-1211. 
Michelson, M.R.  (2003).  “Getting out the Latino vote: how door-to-door canvassing influences 
voter turnout in rural central California.”  Political Behavior 25(3), pp. 247-263. 
Michelson, M.R.  (2005a).  “Meeting the challenge of Latino voter mobilization.”  Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science  601(1), pp. 85-101. 
Michelson, M.R.  (2005b).  “Does ethnicity trump party? Competing vote cues and Latino voting 
behavior.”  Journal of Political Marketing 4(4), pp. 1-25. 
Michelson, M.R.  (2006a).  “Mobilizing the Latino youth vote: some experimental results.”  
Social Science Quarterly 87(5), pp. 1188-1206. 
	   35	  
Michelson, M.R.  (2006b). “Mobilizing Latino voters.” Latino(a) Research Review 6(1-2), pp. 
33-49.  
Michelson, M.R., Bedolla, L.G., & Green, D.P. (2010). “New experiments in voter mobilization: 
third and final report on the California Votes Initiative.” San Francisco: The James Irvine 
Foundation. Report available from: http://www.irvine.org/publications/publications-by-
topic/californiademocracy#civic5 
Michelson, M.R., Bedolla, L.G., & McConnell, M.A. (2009). “Heeding the call: the effect of 
targeted two-round phone banks on voter turnout.” Journal of Politics 71(4), pp. 1549-
1563. 
Nuño, S.A.  (2007).  “Latino mobilization and vote choice in 2000 presidential election.”  
American Politics Research 35(2), pp. 273-293. 
Panagopoulos, C., & Green, D.P. (2011). “Spanish-language radio advertisements and Latino 
voter turnout in the 2006 Congressional elections: field experimental evidence.” Political 
Research Quarterly 64(3), pp. 588-599.  
Panagopoulos, C., & Francia, P.L. (2009).  “Grassroots mobilization in the 2008 presidential 
election.” Journal of Political Marketing. 8(4), pp. 315-333. 
Ramirez, R. (2005). “Giving voice to Latino voters: a field experiment on the effectiveness of a 
national nonpartisan mobilization effort.”  Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 601(1), pp. 66-84. 
Riker, W.H., & Ordeshook, P.C.  (1968).  “A theory of the calculus of voting.”  American 
Political Science Review 62(1), pp. 25-42. 
Rosenstone, S.J., & Hansen, J.M.  (1993).  Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in 
America. New York: Macmillan. 
	   36	  
Shaw, D., de la Garza, R.O., & Lee, J. 2000. “Examining Latino turnout in 1996: a three-state, 
validate survey approach.” American Journal of Political Science 44(2), pp. 338-346. 
Shor, B., Berry, C., & McCarty, N.  (2010).  “A bridge to somewhere: mapping state and 
congressional ideology on a cross-institutional common space.”  Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 35(3), pp. 417-448. 
Stevens, D., & Bishin, B.G.  (2011).  “Getting out the vote: minority mobilization in presidential 
elections.”  Political Behavior 33(1), pp. 113-138.  
Uhlaner, C.J., Cain, B.E., & Kiewiet, D.R. (1989). “Political participation of ethnic minorities in 
the 1980s.” Political Behavior 11(3), pp. 199-225.  
Valdes, M.I., & Seoane, M.  (1995).  Hispanic Market Handbook.  Detroit: Gale Research. 
Verba, S., Schlozman, K.H., & Brady, H.  (1995).  Voice and equality: civic voluntarism in 
American politics.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Verba, S., Schlozman, K.L., Brady, H., & Nie, N.H.  (1993).  “Race, ethnicity and political 
resources: participation in the United States.”  British Journal of Political Science 23(4), 
pp. 453-497. 
Wolfinger, R.E. & Rosenstone, S.J. (1980). Who Votes? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Wolfinger, R.E., Highton, B., & Mullin, M. (2005). “How postregistration laws affect the turnout 
of citizens registered to vote.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 5(1), pp. 1-23.  
Cho, W.K.T. (1999). “Naturalization, socialization, participation: immigrants and (non-)voting.’’ 
Journal of Politics 61(4), pp. 1140-1155.  
